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CONTESTATION AND DEFERENCE IN 
THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SYSTEM 
JORGE CONTESSE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Inter-American human rights system (the IAHRS), in place for over 
fifty years, is composed of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a 
quasi-judicial body that issues recommendations for member states of the 
Organization of American States and submits cases before the Court, and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an international tribunal with 
compulsory jurisdiction over member states1 that have ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights (the American Convention).2 Established amid 
the pressures of the Cold War, the system, contributing to the restoration of 
democracy and the promotion of justice in the region, has dealt for decades 
with the consequences of massive and gross human rights violations. Today, the 
system faces significant legal and institutional challenges. Along with cases 
related to political persecution, torture, and other egregious human rights 
violations stemming from authoritarian regimes, the IAHRS must deal with 
petitions against functioning democracies, as most of the states today in the 
region have left behind authoritarian and dictatorial regimes.3 
This article explores the system’s adjudication model in light of some of the 
conjectures on subsidiarity as a principle for international governance—that is, 
the degree of deference it grants to the assessment of a situation by the member 
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 1.  For the purposes of this article, both Organization of American States member states and 
states that have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights are referred to as member states. 
 2.  Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 [hereinafter American Convention]. 
3.   See Katherine Isbester, Democracy in Latin America: A Political History, in THE PARADOX OF 
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 35, 55 (K. Isbester ed., 2010); see also Mark P. Jones, The Diversity 
of Latin American Democracy, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.worldpolitics 
review.com/articles/11751/the-diversity-of-latin-american-democracy (observing that by the end of the 
1970s, sixteen out of nineteen Latin American countries were governed by military or civilian 
dictatorships, and that in 2012, only Cuba remained as a nondemocratic country). 
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state concerned—that Jachtenfuchs and Krisch propose.4 To that end, the 
article inquires about the system’s role as arbitrator of human rights cases 
within its jurisdiction. It examines the dynamics of subsidiarity in the context of 
the IAHRS and finds that the Inter-American Court embraces a maximalist 
model of adjudication—one that leaves very little, if any, room for states to 
reach their own decisions. The Court’s current approach to supranational 
adjudication is explained as largely resting upon its historical context. 
From a normative perspective, this article examines how the Inter-American 
Court ought to decide its cases. Should the Court act as a tribunal with 
expansive fact-finding powers, or should it instead limit its reach to legal 
questions of interpretation? If the latter, what model of adjudication should the 
Inter-American Court embrace? More generally, can there be an understanding 
of subsidiarity that is particular to the IAHRS? If so, this raises questions about 
the import of the political context in which the Court operates to its attitude 
toward state parties, petitioners, and in general, the cases under its 
consideration. 
This article enriches Jachtenfuchs’s and Krisch’s typology,5 as the matter 
under consideration both questions and confirms some of their conjectures. In 
particular, because some states deem the system’s decisions too intrusive, it may 
be necessary to draw some form of subsidiarity for the Court. At the same time, 
however, the calls for higher subsidiarity play out in the context of an 
international court that has “significant and stable institutional and political 
autonomy.”6 The challenge, then, is to reconcile both claims: on the one hand, 
states’ demands for higher deference, and on the other hand, the importance of 
a powerful and independent regional tribunal. 
II 
SUBSIDIARITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Who should decide—or alternatively, who has—the final word to say what 
the law is? This is arguably one of the most relevant questions for any legal and 
political regime, and a coherent answer will both explain and allow scrutiny of 
the allocation of authority in any given regime.7 In the United States, at least 
since Marbury v. Madison,8 scholars have debated whether the judiciary’s 
 
 4.  See Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 14–19 (offering nine conjectures on the—stronger or weaker—
demand for subsidiarity as a ruling principle for global governance). 
 5.  See id. 
 6.  Id. at 17. 
 7.  For inquiries into the foundations and scope of the subsidiarity principle, see generally 
Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity 6 J. POL. PHIL. 190 (1998); Jonathan Chaplin, Subsidiarity: The Concept 
and the Connections, 4 ETHICAL PERSP. 117 (1997);. In the context of international human rights law, 
see Gerald Neuman, Subsidiarity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 360 (D. Shelton ed., 2013); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International 
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003). 
 8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
6-CONTESSE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2016  3:14 PM 
No. 2 2016] CONTESTATION AND DEFERENCE IN THE IAHRS 125 
authority should extend as far as encompassing the ability to strike down 
legislation. In the European context, the creation of constitutional courts at the 
beginning of the twentieth century also raised key questions about who should 
be “the guardian of the Constitution.”9 In the area of international law, 
particularly international human rights law, these questions continue to receive 
significant attention, especially in Europe, where member states, petitioners 
and even the European Court of Human Rights unceasingly debate the 
European Court’s scope of authority.10 
The doctrine of subsidiarity provides one framework for the allocation of 
power in global governance. Subsidiarity comes into play as a mechanism that 
helps address some of the problems that the rise of international authority 
creates, particularly the increased perception that international authority has a 
democratic deficit.11 Such perception is especially problematic when the issue at 
stake is the protection of human rights by regional courts. If international 
authority must respect principles of democratic self-determination, how should 
international courts address situations in which domestic decisions may indeed 
affect the rights of individuals? Subsidiarity, and its different notions, may help 
address such questions. 
Andreas Føllesdal has articulated the notion of subsidiarity in international 
law as a “rebuttable presumption for the local,”12 that is, the idea that states 
should have “prima facie prioritization” when deciding issues of international 
law.13 This normative theory of subsidiarity presupposes that local units should 
have first right to decide matters of law.14 Notably, most of the scholarly work 
 
 9.  See generally LARS VINX, THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION: HANS KELSEN AND CARL 
SCHMITT ON THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015) (featuring debate over constitutional 
review in Weimar, Germany). 
 10. Perhaps the most recent and salient example of a state’s unease with the European Court’s 
decisions is the hostile position that the United Kingdom has adopted since the Court decided Hirst v. 
United Kingdom in October 2005. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) [GC], 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 
187. In Hirst, the Court found that the United Kingdom’s blanket ban on convicted prisoners voting in 
elections violated European human rights law and ordered the state to amend its legislation. After 
more than ten years, the United Kingdom has failed to comply with the decision. See Ed Bates, 
Analysing the Prisoner Voting Saga and the British Challenge to Strasbourg, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 503, 
503–04 (2014); Robert Spano, Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of 
Subsidiarity, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 488 (2014). On the question of the European Court’s 
legitimacy, see generally KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2015), and on the question of 
international courts’ political legitimacy, see generally THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS REGIMES (Andreas Føllesdal, Johan Karlsson Schaffer & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2013). 
 11.  Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 4, at 3. 
 12.  Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting Self-
Governance and Protecting Human Rights—Or Neither?, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 
147, 148. 
 13.  Mattias Kumm, Sovereignty and the Right to Be Left Alone: Subsidiarity, Justice-Sensitive 
Externalities, and the Proper Domain of the Consent Requirement in International Law, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 239 (observing that subsidiarity “amounts to the proposition that the 
more local unit should have jurisdiction to regulate an issue, unless there are good reasons for the 
overarching, more central level to step in”). 
 14.  Føllesdal offers four different normative justifications for the principle of subsidiarity: 
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on the subject, particularly in Europe, endorses this normative theory of 
subsidiarity.15 
Others have proposed a merely descriptive theory of subsidiarity.16 Gerald 
Neuman has observed that subsidiarity “describes a relationship between two 
institutions or norms, by which one supplements the other in appropriate 
circumstances.”17 Here, subsidiarity does not import any preference—for the 
local, the peripherical, or the central. It merely describes the relationship that 
exists between two (or more) institutions with the power to adjudicate. 
Endorsing this theory of subsidiarity gives parties room to articulate a defense 
of center-controlled decisionmaking, whereas endorsing the normative view 
presupposes that individual states have the first word. Because most accounts of 
subsidiarity in international law give preference to subunits (“the rebuttable 
presumption for the local”),18 the descriptive theory of subsidiarity has the 
burden of articulating arguments against giving such preference. In other words, 
the descriptive theory of subsidiarity leaves room for the argument that the 
center decides in lieu, and not just in subsidio, of the local units. 
The importance of choosing a theory of subsidiarity is highlighted in the 
arena of international human rights law, where differing facts and circumstances 
may require either of the two approaches.19 Subsidiarity in international human 
rights law is a “paradoxical” principle.20 Human rights courts deal with flexible, 
subjective norms subject to great contestation and with politically sensitive 
issues ranging from the validity of self-amnesty laws to the rights of cultural or 
religious minorities or other disadvantaged groups. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that international human rights organs, whether full-scale tribunals or 
human rights treaty bodies, must confront the subsidiarity principle in form and 
scope. 
The following parts examine the specific example of the IAHRS with an 
emphasis on the Inter-American Court and illustrate how this regional system 
addresses the normative and practical challenges raised by the concept of 
subsidiarity. 
 
arguments from liberty, arguments from efficiency, a Catholic argument based on personalism, and 
liberal contractualism. Føllesdal orders the different arguments decreasingly in terms of the autonomy 
granted to subunits. See Føllesdal, supra note 7, at 190. 
 15.  Jachtenfuchs and Krisch observe that there can be at least two versions of subsidiarity: on the 
one hand, a “weak” version, characterized by “a presumption for the local that provides a low 
threshold and can be overcome by any reason that makes action on a higher level appear 
advantageous,” and on the other hand, a “strong” version of subsidiarity that “is characterized by a 
high threshold—a presumption in favor of local governance that can be rebutted only by strong reasons 
in exceptional cases.” Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 4, at 8. 
 16.  Some commentators label these two versions of the principle of subsidiarity as “positive” and 
“negative” subsidiarity. See Ken Endo, The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jack 
Delors 44:6 HOKKAIDO L. REV. 553, 641–42 (1994). 
 17.  Neuman, supra note 7, at 361. 
 18.  Føllesdal, supra note 12 (emphasis added). 
 19.  Id. at 161 (observing that “subsidiarity may support either centralization or decentralization”). 
 20.  See Carozza, supra note 7, at 49 (“[T]he canon of international human rights, like the idea of 
subsidiarity, combines intervention with noninterference.”). 
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III 
RELUCTANCE TOWARD SUBSIDIARITY 
A considerable amount of literature has been written about the history of 
the IAHRS. Scholars have reflected on the history of the IAHRS as well as its 
accomplishments and the challenges it faces, such as the proper response to 
state parties that fail to comply with the Inter-American Commission’s 
recommendations and the Inter-American Court’s decisions.21 Others have 
studied the influence of the IAHRS on domestic courts and whether such 
influence actually enhances the protection of fundamental rights in the 
Americas.22 The existing accounts of the IAHRS, however, do not fully describe 
the Court’s attitude regarding its own authority and the authority of member 
states in cases brought before it. That the Inter-American Court renders 
decisions against states is somehow taken for granted: because states violate 
human rights and there is a regional mechanism for redress, individuals and 
groups should have a way to seek remedies. 
This extremely simplified version of the IAHRS rests upon the assumption 
that Latin American states have historically harbored regimes that violate 
human rights more or less pervasively. Of course, this was true in the early 
years of the Inter-American Court, when, throughout Latin America, military 
dictatorships persecuted political dissidents through massive, large-scale, human 
rights violations.23 Today, the situation is different. Several recent cases, 
discussed below, demonstrate a shift in the region’s political and social 
landscape and in the nature of rights being violated. The current IAHRS often 
addresses claims of human rights infringement by democratic—rather than 
authoritarian—governments, with the violations alleged therein of a less 
extreme and less obvious nature.24 When faced with such cases, the IAHRS 
 
 21.  See generally, e.g., Lea Shaver, The Inter-American Human Rights System: An Effective 
Institution for Regional Rights Protection?, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 639 (2009); Robert K. 
Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 856 (2009). 
 22.  See, e.g., Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American 
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 518–30 (2011); Ariel Dulitzky, 
The Inter-American Human Rights System Fifty Years Later: Time for Changes, 2011 QUE. J. INT’L L. 
127, 138 (2011) (“Almost 60% of the [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights] 
recommendations . . .  are never carried out. Just under 40% are partially complied     with . . . .”); 
Fernando Basch et al., The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: A 
Quantitative Approach to its Functioning and Compliance with its Decisions, 12 SUR—INT’L. J. HUM. 
RTS. 9, 20–29 (2010); see generally HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, U. TEX. SCH. LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2011), https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/04/2012-HRC-IAC 
HR-Maximizing-Justice-Report.pdf (analyzing the struggles facing the Commission and the Court and 
making recommendations for improving their functioning and efficiency). 
 23.  See generally SONIA CARDENAS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: A POLITICS OF 
TERROR AND HOPE (2011) (examining the actions of several of the military dictatorships in Latin 
America). 
 24.  See, e.g., Const. Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 268 (Aug. 28, 2013) (ruling on a 
challenge to lack of procedural protections for dismissed members of Ecuador’s Constitutional 
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commonly uses the Inter-American Court’s articulation of the “conventionality 
control” doctrine.25 
The IAHRS was initially conceived as a collection of tools designed to 
promote, investigate, and repair violations of the rights recognized by the 1948 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American 
Convention.26 It has generated substantial case law concerning fundamental 
rights, and it is widely cited and regarded as the main source of authority for 
human rights in the Americas.27 Both the Inter-American Commission and the 
Inter-American Court have established legal doctrine relating to rights that are 
commonly labeled “first generation rights,” that is, freedom of expression, due 
process, the right to be free from inhuman treatment, and the right to 
protection against arbitrary discrimination, among others.28 The Inter-American 
Commission and the Inter-American Court have issued reports, precautionary 
measures, and advisory opinions to protect persons whose rights have not been 
recognized by the state parties.29 Today the system addresses many different 
human rights issues. It tends to do so, however, without granting deference to 
domestic states, a policy that creates both practical and normative problems. 
 
Tribunal). 
 25.  According to the conventionality-control doctrine, all judges from countries that have ratified 
the American Convention on Human Rights have an obligation to contrast domestic legislation not 
only with the national constitutions, but also with the American Convention and the Court’s 
interpretation of the Convention. This article argues that the doctrine is poorly founded and that it 
inadequately expands the Court’s authority upon states. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 26.  Organization of American States, supra note 2. See also Goldman, supra note 21, at 862 
(discussing the historical origins of the inter-American human rights system). 
 27.  See Claudio Grossman, The Inter-American System of Human Rights: Challenges for the 
Future, 83 IND. L.J. 1267, 1268 (2008) (“The Commission and Court’s case law has been significant in 
advancing the protection of fundamental rights and contributing to such protections throughout the 
different phases of the system’s development.”). See generally LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN & 
AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE-LAW AND 
COMMENTARY (2011). 
 28.  For a comprehensive list of cases, see BURGORGUE-LARSEN & UBEDA DE TORRES, supra 
note 27, at xxxv–xlviii. 
 29.  With respect to the so-called “second-generation rights” or social rights, the Inter-American 
system has been less prone to protect them. The Inter-American Court has stated,  
[T]he issue [of economic, social, and cultural rights] is not reduced to the mere existence of a 
State duty that should orient its tasks as established by this obligation, considering individuals 
as mere witnesses waiting for the State to comply with its obligation under the Convention. 
The Convention is a body of rules on human rights precisely, and not just on general State 
obligations. The existence of an individual dimension to the rights supports the so-called 
“justiciable nature” of the latter, which has advanced at the national level and has a broad 
horizon at the international level. 
“Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 
98, ¶ 3 (Feb. 28, 2003) (García Ramírez, J., concurring). More than a decade ago, Inter-American Court 
Judge Cançado Trindade noted with purpose that, in the future of the inter-American system, “[O]ne 
must … move on to address economic, social, and cultural rights as the true rights that they are.” 
Antonio Cançado Trindade, Reflexiones sobre el Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los 
Derechos Humanos, in EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 573, 
578 (Juan Méndez & Francisco Cox eds, 1998). In circumstances of scarce and poorly distributed fiscal 
resources, the system’s main bodies—the Commission and the Court—will have to face the critical 
necessities of social and economic rights. 
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A. The Velásquez Rodríguez Ethos 
Scholars have identified three distinct periods in the development of the 
IAHRS.30 The first began in 1978, with the entry into force of the American 
Convention, and ended around 1990, as the authoritarian regimes of member 
states lost power. This period is defined by the IAHRS’s responses to 
authoritarian regimes in the region executing massive and systematic human 
rights violations in the form of state policy. The period largely determined the 
system’s original ethos, in which the Inter-American Court was not merely a 
“higher” legal tribunal, but ultimately a moral superior with the power to 
prescribe the actions of state parties and with the function of a last-resort 
remedy to massive human rights violation.31 Addressing nondemocratic member 
states, the Inter-American Court established itself as a locus for rights 
protection and political integrity. 
In 1988, the Inter-American Court handed down its very first decision in 
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras.32 The Court found that Honduras had 
violated several provisions of the American Convention in relation to the 
forced disappearance of Ángel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez, a student at the 
National Autonomous University of Honduras, at the hands of the state’s 
security forces.33 The Court found that the state had violated the right to life, the 
right to humane treatment, and the right to personal liberty; it ordered 
monetary compensation to the victim’s family and continued investigation into 
the disappearance.34 
The state objected to the Inter-American Court hearing the case on the 
ground that the victims had not exhausted domestic remedies—a requirement 
in any case brought before a supplementary supranational system like the 
IAHRS. The Court rejected this argument (although it agreed with Honduras 
that normally a state should first address a human rights claim) with the 
following understanding of subsidiarity: “The rule of prior exhaustion of 
domestic remedies allows the State to resolve the problem under its internal law 
before being confronted with an international proceeding.”35 
 
 
 30.  See Grossman, supra note 27, at 1268; see also Felipe González, La OEA y los Derechos 
Humanos Después del Advenimiento de los Gobiernos Civiles: Expectativas (In)Satisfechas, in 
DERECHOS HUMANOS E INTERÉS PÚBLICO 147 (Felipe González ed., 2001); Víctor Abramovich, From 
Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches and Classic Tensions in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, 11 SUR—INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 6, 9 (2009). 
 31.  See Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 201, 202 (2001). 
 32.  Velásquez Rodríguez v. Hond., Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 
1988). 
 33.  Around the same time, the Inter-American Court decided other cases against Honduras 
dealing with the same issue of forced disappearance. See Godínez Cruz v. Hond., Merits, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5 (Jan. 20, 1989); Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales v. Hond., Merits, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 6 (Mar. 15, 1989). 
 34.  Velásquez Rodríguez (ser. C) No. 4 § XIV ¶¶ 2–5. 
 35.  Id. ¶ 61. 
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[T]he Government stressed that the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic 
remedies is justified because the international system for the protection of human 
rights guaranteed in the Convention is ancillary to its domestic law. 
The observation of the Government is correct. However, it must also be borne in mind 
that the international protection of human rights is founded on the need to protect the 
victim from arbitrary exercise of governmental authority. . . . Thus, whenever a 
petitioner alleges that such remedies do not exist or are illusory, the granting of such 
protection may be not only justified, but urgent.
36
 
In carving out an exception to the exhaustion of the domestic-remedies rule, 
the Court embraced a more aggressive approach for intervention in domestic 
affairs. Further, by acknowledging the preference for local rule but quickly 
rebutting that preference in favor of its own authority, the Court established 
itself as a moral superior—a task made easier by its employment of human 
rights language37 and the fact that the Court was addressing Honduras, a 
country with serious institutional problems. Together these assertions marked 
the early governing ethos of the Inter-American Court. 
The weak form of subsidiarity articulated by the Inter-American Court is 
confirmed by its judgment on reparations. As previously explained, the 
Velásquez Court ordered monetary compensation to the victim’s family—a 
form of reparation that would become the standard in inter-American human 
rights law.38 However, the judges disagreed on how such remedy should be 
implemented. While the Court ordered that the Inter-American Commission 
should play the primary role in determining “the form and amount” of the 
victims’ compensation,39 the minority opinion argued that the victims’ families 
should be able to participate in the damages process.40 The dissent declared that 
the Commission should act only as a type of “public prosecutor in the inter-
American system”41 that participates in the case, but that leaves it to the victims 
and the state “with the intervention of the Commission” to determine the form 
and amount of compensation.42 In this view, the Court’s decisions concerning 
damages ruled against the local and retained for the IAHRS the authority to 
determine the details of reparations. 
In the second phase of the IAHRS development, the system acclimated 
itself to a changing political environment in which member states were 
transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy. It faced a new breed of cases 
addressing human rights questions much subtler—freedom of expression, access 
to information, and transparency—than those raised by the atrocities of the 
 
 36.  Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 1, ¶¶ 92–93 (June 26, 1987). 
 37.  MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 53 (2003) (noting that 
human rights has become “the lingua franca of global moral thought, as English has become the lingua 
franca of the global economy”). 
 38.  See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 365 (2008). 
 39.  Velásquez Rodríguez, (ser. C) No. 4 § XIV, ¶ 6. 
 40.  Id. ¶ 1 (Piza-Escalante, J., dissenting). 
 41.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 42.  Id. ¶ 1. 
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earlier period. The IAHRS responded with a broader, more political approach 
to human rights issues, with diplomacy and flexible standards taking center 
stage, as the increased use of the friendly settlement mechanism shows.43 Still, 
most of the Inter-American Court’s work continued to address the mass 
atrocities committed in earlier years.44 
Besides “protecting” human rights in the Americas, the Organization of 
American States reinforced its mission to “promote” them, a function which by 
its nature allows for greater deference to states. Aylwin Azócar v. Chile45 
provides one example. In that case, a group of individuals challenged Chile’s 
electoral system as infringing several provisions of the American Convention.46 
The Commission found that Chile had in fact violated the rights of several 
individuals and ordered the country to 
adopt the measures necessary to bring its domestic legal order into line with the 
provisions of the American Convention, so as to guarantee fully, for all Chilean 
citizens, including the victims in this case, the exercise of the right to vote and to be 
elected in general conditions of equality, as set forth in Articles 23 and 24 of the 
American Convention, in respect of the composition of the Chilean Senate, as a 
bicameral legislative organ of popular representation of the Chilean Congress.
47
 
 
 43.  Goldman explains that the Commission’s work focused on certain countries, like Colombia 
and Perú, and observes how the Commission commenced using the mechanism of friendly settlement 
with states. Goldman, supra note 21, at 874–82. 
 44.  The Court decided cases related to the right to life, the right to humane treatment, personal 
liberty, and the right to judicial protection. See, e.g., El Amparo v. Venezuela, Merits, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 19 (Jan. 18, 1995); Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 16 (Jan. 21, 1994); Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15 (Sept. 10, 1993). 
 45.  Andrés Aylwin Azócar v. Chile, Case 11.863, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R, Report No. 137/99, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc. 6 rev. (1999). 
 46.  Id. ¶ 2 (“[T]he designation of senators in the manner provided for under the new 
constitutional order in Chile constitutes an institution that violates the right to equality in voting, is 
inimical to popular sovereignty, and represents an obstacle making it practically impossible to change 
the non-democratic institutions established in the Chilean Constitution.”). In the original text of the 
Chilean Constitution, enacted by General Augusto Pinochet, there were reserved seats for appointed 
senators and former presidents—like Pinochet himself, who, after retiring from the Army, became a 
senator-for-life. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] Oct. 21, 1980, art. 45, 
translated in Constitution of the Republic of Chile, Constitution Finder, http://confinder.richmond 
.edu/admin/docs/Chile.pdf. 
 47.  Id. ¶ 161. Article 23 of the American Convention establishes the right to participate in 
government: 
1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: 
   a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
   b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; 
and 
   c. to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country. 
2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the 
preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil 
and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings. 
Article 24 states that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, 
without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.” 
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In a dissenting opinion, Commissioner Robert Goldman criticized the 
Commission’s position. Goldman embraced a deferential approach based on 
the Commission’s duty to promote human rights. Goldman observed, 
Even though Article 23 assumes the existence of a government structure that is 
democratic and representative in nature, it does not stipulate a definitive model 
concerning how the state should be organized to institutionalize representative 
democracy in an ideal fashion, much less how the seats in the legislative branch should 
be distributed. Therefore, claims alleging the incompatibility of a particular 
institutional model with the principles underlying Article 23 should be analyzed with 
special deference to the state parties, and the Commission must carefully consider 
whether it is appropriate to take a position regarding the advisability of a particular 
model. I believe that unless the institutional structure established by the state impedes 
the effective expression of the will of the citizens in a manifestly arbitrary manner, the 
Commission should in principle refrain from passing judgment on that structure’s 
proximity to an ideal model, at least in the context of examining an individual case. In 
this regard, issues concerning the advisability of particular models of political 
participation more appropriately fall within the mandate of the Commission to promote 
human rights.
48
 
Goldman, however, was alone in this position. As explained, the 
Commission did find that, by enacting a particular electoral system, Chile had 
violated the American Convention.49 
The third period of the IAHRS began around 1996 with the system’s 
response to pressure from the transnational civil society to shift focus from the 
“promotion” of human rights and the establishment of the rule of law in 
emerging democracies to the “protection” of the rights of individuals and 
groups within these newly established democracies.50 Human rights advocates 
demanded that supranational bodies take steps to protect the rights of specific 
vulnerable groups, such as women, LGBTI individuals, and indigenous peoples. 
As a result, in 2001, new procedural rules eased the process of bringing a claim 
before the system, a shift that successfully increased the number of cases 
submitted before both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American 
Court.51 At the same time, the OAS allowed nongovernmental organizations to 
formally participate in its assemblies, thereby fostering dialogue regarding the 
protection of human rights and the rule of law in the Americas.52 The language 
 
 48.  Id. ¶ 4 (Goldman, Comm’r, dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 49.  Id. ¶ 159. 
 50.  It is understood that education through conferences, lectures, and other activities to spread the 
word corresponds to the scope of promotion, whereas monitoring State compliance with international 
human rights standards belongs to the field of protection. Almost two decades ago, in fact, human 
rights lawyers convened experts to debate the future of the inter-American system, which, according to 
them, was experiencing “an identity crisis” due to “the fundamental lack of agreement among the key 
players about the legal and political character of the system and its future direction.” JUAN MÉNDEZ & 
FRANCISCO COX, EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 9 (1998). 
 51.  Goldman observed that “[t]he annual average number of petitions received between 1997 and 
2001 was 609. The Commission received 1,456 new complaints in 2007, an approximate seventy-percent 
increase in a ten-year period.” Goldman, supra note 21, at 883. 
 52.  In 1999, the OAS adopted new Guidelines to grant civil-society organizations legal status with 
the Organization. See Organization of American States, Permanent Council Res. 759, Guidelines for the 
Participation of Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities (Dec. 15, 1999). 
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of rights would no longer be the sole province of the Court. Human rights 
advocates and state officials could now interact through channels provided by 
the IAHRS. 
Since the early 2000s, largely due to the newly established procedural rules, 
the IAHRS has received more cases per year and in an array of subject matters 
more diverse than in prior decades. There is now a new phase in the historical 
development of the system—one in which the Inter-American Court has 
explicitly established itself as a final interpreter of the American Convention 
and asserts that domestic judges have an obligation to directly enforce the 
American Convention.53 These are not trivial developments. In a context of 
more democratic regimes and more diverse areas of human rights issues, the 
IAHRS—particularly through the Inter-American Court’s case law—has 
become markedly less deferential toward member states. 
It is unsurprising that the system today faces resistance from states that see 
it as an unwelcome intrusion into their domestic affairs.54 When the system 
started handing down decisions, many states had no democratic credentials. 
Consequently, they had little credibility to push back against the Court. The 
Court embraced a standard and an almost-mechanical form of deference by 
citing to the rules of prior exhaustion of remedies and the general 
complementary character of international authority.55 The newly established 
democracies, in contrast, want to participate and actually do take part in the 
regional governance. The Court is now within their reach. 
Furthermore, the Velásquez ethos is still very much present, at least in some 
of the leading voices of the IAHRS. One such leading voice is that of former 
President of the Inter-American Court and current judge at the International 
Court of Justice, Antonio Cançado Trindade. Cançado Trindade recently 
reiterated his strong opposition to the potential adoption by the IAHRS of the 
“margin of appreciation” doctrine, a well-established doctrine in European 
human rights law.56 The margin-of-appreciation doctrine prescribes that a 
 
 53.  See Jorge Contesse, The Final Word? Constitutional Dialogue and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2016). 
 54.  In 2013, Venezuela denounced the American Convention, and the Dominican Republic is 
considering doing the same. See infra Part III.C. 
 55.  It is a common part of any decision that the Court confirms that petitioners have in fact 
exhausted domestic judicial remedies. The Court’s understanding of this rule has traditionally been less 
strict than that of other international tribunals. Dinah Shelton, The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 333, 344 (1994). 
 56.  See generally ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY (2012); YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE 
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (2002) (discussing the development of the doctrine and its effect in 
ECHR cases granting member states discretion in implementing human rights standards); Marisa 
Iglesias Vila, Una Doctrina del Margen de Apreciación Estatal para el CEDH: En Busca de un 
Equilibrio entre Democracia y Derechos en la Esfera Internacional, in DERECHOS HUMANOS: 
POSIBILIDADES TEÓRICAS Y DESAFÍOS PRÁCTICOS 14–39 (R. Saba ed., 2014); Ronald St. J. 
Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Ronald St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993). For a broader discussion of the margin-of-
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regional human rights court should grant member states relatively wide berth in 
the regulation of human rights affairs given that they are closer to the case at 
hand, in time and geography, than are international bodies. The traditional 
understanding is that the margin of appreciation refers to cases where 
fundamental rights may conflict with public morals, typically defended by the 
state. Thus the doctrine often arises in the case of highly contested moral issues, 
such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, or sexuality rights. In the 
landmark 1976 case of Handyside v. United Kingdom57 the European Court of 
Human Rights accorded for the first time a margin of appreciation to the 
European States. In this decision, the Court found that that the censoring 
restrictions imposed on a book publisher were both prescribed by law and in 
pursuit of a legitimate aim, pursuant to the norms of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.58 Therefore, the Court denied the publisher’s petition and 
ruled in favor of the State, upholding the United Kingdom’s prohibition of a 
publication. The margin-of-appreciation doctrine was born and, with it, the idea 
that the doctrine served states’ purpose to limit fundamental liberties. 
As recently as 2008, Cançado Trindade has rejected the adoption of the 
margin of appreciation as inappropriate in the sociopolitical context of the 
IAHRS’s jurisdiction: 
Fortunately, such doctrine has not been developed within the inter-American human 
rights system. . . . How could we apply [the margin-of-appreciation doctrine] in the 
context of a regional human rights system where many countries’ judges are subject to 
intimidation and pressure? How could we apply it in a region where the judicial 
function does not distinguish between military jurisdiction and ordinary jurisdiction? 
How could we apply it in the context of national legal systems that are heavily 
questioned for the failure to combat impunity? . . . We have no alternative but to 
strengthen the international mechanisms for protection . . . .
59
 
One could understand such a statement from an Inter-American Court’s 
judge in the late 1980s, but after two decades of case law and significant political 
and legal developments in the region, one might expect a more nuanced 
approach to the relationship between the Court and state parties. 
B. Current Manifestations: The Maximalist Court 
In recent years, the IAHRS’s reluctance toward subsidiarity has taken new 
shape. The Inter-American Court’s articulation of the doctrine of 
conventionality control and the maximalist approach found in certain decisions 
illustrate this shift. This part considers a specific decision—Gelman v. 
 
appreciation doctrine, see generally Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
in International Law? 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005) (citing International Court of Justice cases as well 
as European Court of Justice and WTO Dispute Settlement Body cases as examples of tribunals giving 
more or less consideration to the margin-of-appreciation doctrine). 
 57.  Handyside v. U.K., 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). 
 58.  Id. ¶¶ 44–46. 
 59.  See ANTONIO CANÇADO TRINDADE, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS 
HUMANOS EN EL SIGLO XXI 389–90 (2008). 
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Uruguay60—that sheds light on the Court’s attitude toward states’ authority to 
rule on human rights issues from the past. This part also examines the Court’s 
adoption of the conventionality control, a doctrine whereby domestic courts 
have an obligation to enforce the American Convention as interpreted by the 
Inter-American Court. Gelman, along with the articulation of conventionality 
control, shows the Inter-American Court’s current limited understanding of 
subsidiarity as a governing principle of international law. 
1. The Gelman Decision 
Between 1973 and 1985 a military dictatorship ruled in Uruguay.61 Like 
other South American countries, Uruguay enacted the Uruguayan Expiry Law, 
which prevented state authorities from investigating crimes committed by state 
agents during the dictatorship years.62 The law granted amnesty to military and 
police officers for human rights violations committed during the dictatorship.63 
Like other Latin American countries that also passed amnesty laws—for 
example, Chile or Peru—Uruguay sought to ensure social peace after a difficult 
period of dictatorship and serious social unrest.64 Unlike some of the named 
countries, however, it was not a military junta (as in the case of Chile) or an 
elected president who had previously dissolved the Congress (as in the case of 
Peru) that adopted the self-amnesty laws. In Uruguay, the enactment of the 
Expiry Law was the decision of a fully democratic Congress. 
Furthermore, the law was twice upheld by popular vote. In 1989, a proposal 
to partially repeal the law was ultimately defeated by fifty-eight percent of the 
votes.65 Two decades later, a progressive political party collected hundreds of 
thousands of signatures to challenge the law through popular vote. Again, the 
vote for upholding the legislation prevailed—albeit with a close margin of fifty- 
 
 
 60.  Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221 
(Feb. 24, 2011). 
 61.  As in other regimes in the Southern Cone of Latin America, in Uruguay the civilian–military 
regime executed mass human rights violations, such as torture, extrajudicial executions, and mass 
imprisonment of political opponents. According to international reports, by 1976 “Uruguay had more 
prisoners per capita than any other country in the world. With a total population of three million 
people, roughly ten percent went into exile (300,000 to 350,000 people); over twenty percent of all 
citizens were imprisoned at some point during this period (600,000 to 650,000 Uruguayans); and almost 
25,000 people received long prison sentences for alleged political offenses.” See JAVIER A. GALVÁN, 
LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS OF THE 20TH CENTURY: THE LIVES AND REGIMES OF 15 RULERS 135 
(2013). 
 62.  Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado, Ley No. 15.848 [Expiry Law], Dec. 22, 
1986, D.O. 22295 (Uru.) [hereinafter Expiry Law]. 
 63.  Id. art. 1. 
 64.  Amnesty laws like those of Chile can be found also in other countries, including Argentina, 
which in 1986 and 1987 produced the so-called “impunity laws,” Law No. 23492, Dec. 24, 1986, B.O. 
21864 and Law No. 23521, June 8, 1987, B.O. 21746 (or Full Stop and Due Obedience Acts); Uruguay, 
which adopted the “Expiry Law” in 1986, supra note 62; or Brazil, which did the same in 1979, Lei No. 
6683, de 28 De Agosto De 1979, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 28.8.1979.  
 65.  Gelman, (ser. C) No. 221 ¶ 146. 
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two percent.66 The Expiry Law was well in effect, “despite its safe harbor for 
human rights violations.”67 
In 2011, the Inter-American Court found that, by adopting an amnesty law 
for the crimes committed by security forces during the military dictatorship, 
Uruguay had violated the American Convention and the Inter-American 
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons.68 Gelman is a fine example of 
the Inter-American Court’s expansive approach toward the protection of 
human rights and generally of “the human rights movement’s attachment to the 
fight against impunity and its uses of criminal law in the process.”69 The Court 
reasoned that the Uruguayan law in question, despite popular support 
domestically, lacked any validity because it prevented authorities from 
investigating and punishing those responsible for gross and massive human 
rights violations.70 
In reaching this decision, the Court expanded its well-established case law 
on the incompatibility of self-amnesty legislation.71 The fundamental difference 
here from earlier cases was, as explained, that Uruguay had decided through 
democratic decision-making processes to both enact and uphold this legislation. 
It was against such democratic background that the Inter-American Court 
rendered its decision. Gelman therefore raises a fundamental question in the 
confrontation between international human rights law and democratic 
legitimacy: May a regional human rights court overrule the will of the people 
manifested in a formal vote?72 
The Court should have articulated a theory to justify its ruling against the 
will of the Uruguayan people. It failed, however, to do so. The Court stated, 
The fact that the Expiry Law of the State has been approved in a democratic 
regime and yet ratified or supported by the public, on two occasions, namely, 
through the exercise of direct democracy, does not automatically or by itself grant 
legitimacy under International Law. The participation of the public in relation 
with the law, using methods of direct exercise of democracy, -referendum 
(paragraph 2 of Article 79 of the Constitution of Uruguay) - in 1989 and 
“plebiscite [sic] (letter A of Article 331 of the Constitution of Uruguay) regarding 
a referendum that declared as null Articles 1 and 4 of the Law – therefore, 
 
 66.  Id. ¶ 148. 
 67.  Daniel Soltman, Applauding Uruguay’s Quest for Justice: Dictatorship, Amnesty, and Repeal of 
Uruguay Law No. 15.848, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 829, 832 (2013). 
 68.  See Gelman, (ser. C) No. 221 ¶ 246 (relating to the forced disappearance of an Argentinean 
national at the hands of the Uruguayan security forces). 
 69.  Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1069, 1127 (2015). 
 70.  See Gelman, (ser. C) No. 221 ¶ 232. 
 71.  See, e.g., La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 162 (Nov. 29, 2006); Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006); Goiburú v. 
Para., Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (Sept. 22, 2006); 
Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001); Blake v. 
Guat., Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36 (Jan. 24, 1998).  
 72.  Roberto Gargarella, La Democracia Frente a los Crímenes Masivos: Una Reflexión a la Luz del 
Caso Gelman, 2 REV. LAT. DER. INT’L 1, 2 (2015). 
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October 25, 2009, should be considered, as an act attributable to the State that 
give rise to its international responsibility. . . . 
The democratic legitimacy of specific facts in a society is limited by the norms of 
protection of human rights recognized in international treaties, such as the 
American Convention, in such a form that the existence of one true democratic 
regime is determined by both its formal and substantial characteristics, and 
therefore, particularly in cases of serious violations of nonrevocable norms of 
International Law, the protection of human rights constitutes a impassable [sic] 
limit to the rule of majority . . . .
73
 
The Inter-American Court has long established that amnesty laws are 
invalid under the American Convention on Human Rights.74 But the Court 
should have made an effort to better justify its ruling in Gelman, because the 
Uruguayan Expiry Law has more legitimacy than other amnesty laws enacted in 
Latin America. In other words, even if the Court had decided that it must 
uphold its established case law on impunity and amnesty legislation, good 
reasons existed for the Court to take a more deferential approach in this 
particular case. Such an approach required, at least, a greater effort at finding 
Uruguay internationally responsible for passing the Expiry Law and upholding 
the law’s validity twice through popular vote. 
2. The Conventionality Control Doctrine 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has articulated a doctrine 
under which judges and other national authorities are obligated to disregard 
domestic regulations that fail to conform to the clauses of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, as well as the Court’s authoritative 
interpretation of the Convention.75 By charging judges and national authorities 
with this responsibility, conventionality control seeks to strengthen human 
rights protection in the region. However, its implementation has not been 
without difficulties and has generated criticism.76 It is, in fact, another example 
 
 73.  Gelman, (ser. C) No. 221 ¶¶ 238–39. 
 74.  Id. ¶ 225. 
 75.  The first holding in which the Inter-American Court in its entirety—that is, not just one of the 
judges, in separate opinions, as had happened before—upheld this doctrine was Almonacid Arellano, 
(ser. C) No. 154, issued in September 2006. Soon after, the Inter-American Court restated this notion of 
“conventional control,” albeit with some nuanced changes and other larger differences, in the following 
holdings: Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209 (Nov. 23, 2009); Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012); 
Heliodoro-Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186 (Aug. 12, 2008); Boyce v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169 (Nov. 20, 2007); La Cantuta, 
(ser. C) No. 162; Dismissed Cong. Emp. v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158 (Nov. 24, 2006).  
 76.  See generally Ariel E. Dulitzky, An Inter-American Constitutional Court? The Invention of the 
Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 50 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 45 (2015) 
(describing the Court’s creation of itself as a constitutional court and offering suggested improvements) 
and Roberto Niembro Ortega, Sobre la legitimidad democrática del diálogo entre jueces nacionales e 
internacionales tratándose de derechos fundamentales, in ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS DE DIREITOS 
HUMANOS 112 (Armin von Bogdandy, Flavia Piovesan & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds., 2013) 
(examining the challenges of the democratic legitimacy of international judges ruling on fundamental 
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of the IAHRS’s current reluctance to embrace subsidiarity—confirming what 
commentators view as the Court’s excessive interference with domestic 
powers.77 
A former judge of the Inter-American Court, Sergio García Ramírez, in a 
number of separate opinions, first mentioned the idea of reviewing domestic 
statutes to ensure their conformity with the provisions of the American 
Convention.78 The Court did not decide to adopt García’s doctrine until 
September of 2006. In a case against Chile that concerned the existence of an 
amnesty law impeding the investigation and prosecution of gross and massive 
human rights violations committed during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, the 
Court declared that 
domestic judges and courts are bound to respect the rule of law, and therefore, they 
are bound to apply the provisions in force within the legal system. But when a State 
has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as 
part of the State, are also bound by such Convention. This forces them to see that all 
the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by 
the enforcement of laws which are contrary to its purpose and that have not had any 
legal effects since their inception. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a sort of 
“conventionality control” between the domestic legal provisions which are applied to 
specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. To perform this task, 
the Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation 
thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the 
American Convention.
79
 
Because the American Convention itself does not contain any rule requiring 
national judges to carry out this type of review, the first concern raised by the 
doctrine is it may lack an actual basis in law.80 With the Inter-American Court 
deciding cases since the late 1980s, it is hard to explain why it took it twenty 
years to “discover” that domestic judges have an obligation to override laws 
that conflict with the Convention. The basis for this obligation, the Court 
maintains in Almonacid, lies in states’ duty to enforce international treaties “in 
good faith,” pursuant to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
 
rights). 
 77.  See Ezequiel Malarino, Judicial Activism, Punitivism and Supranationalisation: Illiberal and 
Antidemocratic Tendencies of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 665, 
685–94 (2012). 
 78.  See López Álvarez v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 141, ¶ 4 (Feb. 1, 2006) (García-Ramírez, J., concurring); Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, ¶ 6 (Sept. 7, 
2004) (García-Ramírez, J., concurring); Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, ¶ 26 (Nov. 25, 2003) (García-Ramírez, J., 
concurring); see also Juan Carlos Hitters, Control de Constitucionalidad y Control de Convencionalidad. 
Comparación (Criterios Fijados por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos), 7 ESTUDIOS 
CONSTITUCIONALES, no. 2, 2009, at 109, 113–14 (2009). 
 79.  Almonacid Arellano, (ser. C) No. 154 ¶ 124. 
 80.  See Ximena Fuentes, International and Domestic Law: Definitely an Odd Couple, 77 REV. JUR. 
U.P.R. 483, 487–88 (2008); see also Karlos Castilla Juárez, Control Interno o Difuso de 
Convencionalidad? Una Mejor Idea: la Garantía de los Tratados, 13 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE 
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 51, 81 (2013). 
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Treaties.81 There the Court also cites Article 27 of the Vienna Convention,82 
which establishes that a state “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law 
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”83 As such, the Court seems to 
assert domestic judges’ obligation to give direct effect to the Convention in 
domestic law. 
For some, the doctrine introduced in 2006 represents a significant advance 
in regional human rights protection. As Castilla Juárez points out, most authors 
have praised the adoption of the conventionality-control doctrine.84 Others, 
however, have warned that it creates problems of judicial interpretation and 
have criticized the Inter-American Court’s haste in introducing a notion that, at 
the very least, affects states’ grants of jurisdiction at the local level.85 
Following the holding in Almonacid, the Court has reiterated the notion of 
conventionality control in a number of rulings.86 For example, although the 
Court initially believed that judges were required to carry out “a sort of 
conventionality control” (without indicating what sort of control that might 
entail), it would later invoke an unqualified notion of control without describing 
how this review differs from the earlier “sort” of review.87 The Court added that 
judges were required to exercise conventionality control not just if the involved 
parties requested it, but by obligation.88 Finally, the Court suggested that 
national judges are obligated to ensure the fulfillment of the “practical effects”  
 
 
 
 81.  Almonacid Arellano, (ser. C) No. 154 ¶ 125 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331). 
 82. Almonacid Arellano, (ser. C) No. 154 ¶ 125 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331). 
 83. Almonacid Arellano, (ser. C) No. 154 ¶ 125; see also Juana María Ibáñez Rivas, Control de 
Convencionalidad: Precisiones Para su Aplicación Desde la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos, ANUARIO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 103, 106–07 (2012); Néstor Pedro Sagües, 
Obligaciones Internacionales y Control de Convencionalidad, 8 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 117, 
120 (2010). 
 84.  A brief bibliographical list can be found in Castilla Juárez, supra note 80. 
 85.  Offering varying degrees of criticism, see generally Ariel E. Dulitzky, An Inter-American 
Constitutional Court? The Invention of the Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 50 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 45 (2015); Fuentes, supra note 80; Castilla Juárez, supra note 80 
Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, The Conventionality Control: Examples of (Un)Successful Experiences in 
Latin America, 3 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 200 (2010). 
 86.  See Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209 (Nov. 23, 2009); Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012); 
Heliodoro-Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186 (Aug. 12, 2008); Boyce v. Barb., Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169 (Nov. 20, 2007); La Cantuta v. 
Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162 (Nov. 29, 2006); 
Dismissed Cong. Emp. v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158 (Nov. 24, 2006). 
 87.  Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 ¶ 124 (Sept. 26, 2006) (emphasis added). 
 88.  Ibáñez Rivas, supra note 83, at 112. 
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of international treaties, a concept that would add another element to 
conventionality control.89 
Nevertheless, it is unclear how, out of a prohibition on using domestic norms 
to justify noncompliance with international obligations—which can, of course, 
trigger international responsibility on the state’s part—arises a specific 
requirement to reassign court jurisdiction at the domestic level, thus endowing 
judges with powers that the domestic legal system may not grant them.90 This 
problem becomes evident when considering the diverse models of constitutional 
review found in Latin America.91 
The Inter-American Court did not acknowledge these problems until after 
Almonacid. In the case Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et 
al.) v. Peru,92 for example, the Court added a modification to conventionality 
control, determining that the “organs of the Judiciary” must carry it out 
“obviously, within the framework of their respective competences and of the 
corresponding procedural regulations.”93 In a sense, this elaboration of the 
doctrine improved it somewhat because it now abides by the specifics of diverse 
domestic regulations, even though inconsistencies remain. For example, due to 
the Court’s insistence that conventionality control must be carried out ex 
officio, there is a question about what happens when the discrepancy between 
legal provisions and the constitution can only be resolved by formal request. 
According to the Inter-American Court this would be a problem, but in certain 
countries, constitutional review of the law can be exercised only by certain 
courts, as opposed to all judges, suggesting that the Court is still confronted 
 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See María Carmelina Londoño Lázaro, El Principio de Legalidad y el Control de 
Convencionalidad de las Leyes: Confluencias y Perspectivas en el Pensamiento de la Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 128 BOLETÍN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 761, 810 
(2010). 
 91.  Taking Argentina, Chile, and Colombia as examples, it is possible to illustrate the 
aforementioned problem: whereas in Argentina the power of constitutional review is “diffuse,” that is, 
held by all judges, Chile and Colombia have “concentrated” constitutional review, in which only a 
single specialized court possesses the power to invalidate laws that contravene the constitution. In 
articulating the notion of conventionality control, the Inter-American Court ignored the distinction 
between diffuse and concentrated models of constitutional control. Thus, as a matter of logic, the 
obligation introduced by the Court is fulfilled differently depending on whether national laws grant all 
or only some judges the power to invalidate laws counter to the constitution. This means that if, in 
Chile, a court of first instance determines that a domestic law contradicts any clause of the American 
Convention or its interpretation by the Inter-American Court, under the conventionality-control 
doctrine, the court would have to refuse to apply that law. Yet in so doing, the court would violate 
those laws stipulating that only the constitutional court has the power to declare legal precepts 
unconstitutional—specifically, C.P. Oct. 21, 1980 art. 93, No. 6. In Argentina, meanwhile, that same 
court of first instance could discharge the duty imposed upon it by the Inter-American Court without 
imperiling internal laws regarding the assignment of court jurisdiction. 
 92.  Dismissed Cong. Emp. v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158 (Nov. 24, 2006).  
 93.  Id. ¶ 128. This formula would later be reiterated in Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 339 (Nov. 
23, 2009), and in Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 282 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
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with the prospect of overthrowing the domestic organic standards of the states 
that give it power. 
The Court’s adoption of the conventionality control raises both theoretical 
and practical problems. It also raises questions about the Court’s understanding 
of its relationship with states and reinforces the IAHRS’s reluctance toward 
forms of deference. As explained below, the current political and legal 
landscape calls for a revision of the system’s notion of subsidiarity. The Court’s 
authority and the strengthening of the system are good reasons to consider the 
adoption of mechanisms for judicial deference. 
IV 
DEFERENCE: A NEW APPROACH? 
It is possible to articulate a principle of subsidiarity for use in the IAHRS. 
To do so, however, scenarios must be considered in which the system has 
embraced normative subsidiarity (in some form) as a strong basis for a more 
deferential approach in international human rights adjudication. 
A. Margin of Appreciation in the IAHRS 
As previously explained, most scholars believe that the margin-of-
appreciation doctrine is almost entirely foreign to the IAHRS.94 This is not 
entirely accurate. Both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court have made reference to and employed the margin-of-
appreciation doctrine in several decisions—albeit inconsistently. 
First, the IAHRS has made use of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine in 
discussions concerning political participation, particularly the kind described in 
Article 23 of the American Convention.95 For example, in a case against 
Guatemala, the Inter-American Commission found that 
the context of Guatemalan and international constitutional law in which this condition 
of ineligibility is placed is the appropriate dimension for analysis of the applicability of 
the Convention in general, and of the applicability of its Arts. 23 and 32 [of the 
American Convention] to the instant case, and from which the margin of appreciation 
allowed by international law can emerge.
96
 
 
 
 94.  See, e.g., CANÇADO TRINDADE, supra note 59; see also Pablo Contreras, National Discretion 
and International Deference in the Restriction of Human Rights: A Comparison Between the 
Jurisprudence of the European and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 11 NW. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 28, 61–66 (2012) (discussing opposing views on the reception of the margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine in the Americas). 
 95.  See Andrés Aylwin Azócar v. Chile, Case 11.863, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R, Report No. 137/99, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc. 6 rev. ¶ 161 (1999). 
 96.  Montt v. Guatemala, Case 10.804, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 30/93, 
OEA/Ser.L/V.85 doc. 9 rev. ¶ 24 (1993) (emphasis added). American Convention, supra note 2, Article 
32 states that “[e]very person has responsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind.” It also 
has a general rule of interpretation wherein “[t]he rights of each person are limited by the rights of 
others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.” 
Id. 
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In other decisions and reports, both the Inter-American Commission and 
the Inter-American Court have interpreted Article 23 in line with the margin-
of-appreciation doctrine.97 Both bodies, however, have failed to explain why and 
how the doctrine should be used. Reconstructing these decisions, one may note 
that the subject matter at hand allowed for an even more deferential approach 
from the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court. 
Notably, in these cases, the system was dealing with procedural human 
rights issues, as opposed to substantive matters such as sexuality rights. The 
Court could have articulated a version of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine 
that distinguishes “structural” or “procedural” issues (for instance, cases on 
political participation) on the one hand, and “substantive” issues (such as cases 
related to the recognition of equal-protection rights) on the other.98 
B. The Court as Fact-Finder 
Lengthy decisions are a trademark of the Inter-American Court, with 
rulings often spanning several hundred pages. Although it may be important for 
a court to provide factual and legal contexts, the length of the Court’s rulings is 
also symptomatic of the Inter-American Court’s decision to fact-find—a task 
better left to individual states. 
The role of the Inter-American Court is to examine whether or not the state 
has violated a right protected by the American Convention. In several instances 
the Court has explicitly adhered to the “fourth instance” doctrine, which states 
 
 97.  See Statehood Solidarity Comm. v. U.S., Case 11.204, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
98/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118 doc. 5 rev. 2 ¶ 88 (2003) (“[T]he Commission has recognized that a degree 
of autonomy must be afforded to states in organizing their political institutions so as to give effect to 
these rights, as the right to political participation leaves room for a wide variety of forms of 
government. As the Commission has appreciated, its role or objective is not to create a uniform model 
of representative democracy for all states, but rather is to determine whether a state’s laws infringe 
fundamental human rights. The Commission has similarly recognized that not all differences in 
treatment are prohibited under international human rights law, and this applies equally to the right to 
participate in government.”); Aylwin Azócar, Report No. 137/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc. 6 rev. ¶ 4 
(Goldman, Comm’r, dissenting); see also Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 184, ¶ 155 (Aug. 6, 2008) (“Article 
23(2) of the American Convention establishes that the law may regulate the exercise and opportunities 
of such rights only on the basis of ‘age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental 
capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.’ The provision that limits the 
reasons for which it is possible to restrict the use of the rights of paragraph 1 has only one purpose—in 
light of the Convention as a whole and of its essential principles—to avoid the possibility of 
discrimination against individuals in the exercise of their political rights. It is evident that the inclusion 
of these reasons refers to the enabling conditions that the law can impose to exercise political rights. 
Restrictions based on these criteria are common in national electoral laws, which provide for the 
establishment of the minimum age to vote and to be elected, and some connection to the electoral 
district where the right is exercised, among other regulations. Provided that they are not 
disproportionate or unreasonable, these are limits that the States may legitimately establish to regulate 
the exercise and enjoyment of political rights and that, it should be repeated, they refer to certain 
requirements that the titleholders of political rights must comply with so as to be able to exercise 
them.”). 
 98.  On the distinction between structural and procedural margin of appreciation, see generally 
George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 705 (2006). 
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that international courts should not act as fact-finders, but rather are limited to 
a determination of questions of law.99 When a court ignores this doctrine and 
reviews witness testimonies, expert testimonies, and other evidence, it 
trespasses on the territory of domestic courts, which are better positioned in 
time and geography to assess evidence. If a state’s authorities, say, the judiciary 
or the prosecutor’s office, fail to conduct investigations and adjudicate, there 
are better reasons for a regional court to intervene. Even then, in the case of 
due process violations, the regional court could still remand the case to 
domestic courts for additional fact-finding. 
In relation to the expansive investigative function that the Inter-American 
Court sometimes plays, it has also been very aggressive in providing remedies.100 
The Inter-American Court not only orders monetary compensation, but it 
orders legal (or even constitutional) reforms,101 judicial training,102 the erection 
of monuments or memorials for the victims,103 and the publication of the 
decisions it hands down,104 among other remedies. Moreover, the Court usually 
establishes timeframes for compliance and issues periodic reports that monitor 
whether or not states enforce the Court’s decisions (thus creating a new 
problem, namely, lack of enforcement). Through these reports, the Court 
exposes states’ lack of compliance—a matter that has received significant 
scholarly attention.105 Commentators usually praise the Court’s “creative” 
approach to remedies, which contrasts with the European Court’s more 
restrained approach.106 The Court’s willingness to craft expansive remedies 
itself, however, rather than defer to domestic law and domestic courts, is yet 
another example of its rejection of normative subsidiarity. 
For this reason, the Court could adopt a less aggressive approach to 
remedies. It could declare that there has been a violation and that 
compensation is in order, but then leave it to the state to offer a path for repair. 
The Court could retain the authority to review state compliance, albeit in a less 
aggressive manner, giving an enhanced role to the state that violated the 
American Convention. Additionally, this could improve enforcement, as it 
 
 99.  On the “fourth instance” formula, see Marzioni v. Argentina, Case 11.673, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 39/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 48 (1996); JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 92–95 (2013). 
 100. See generally Antkowiak, supra note 38 (providing examples of the varied equitable remedies 
employed by the Inter-American Court along with damages). 
 101. Id. at 382–83. 
 102. Id. at 384. 
 103. Id. at 381–82. 
 104. Id. at 380. 
 105. See David C. Baluarte, Strategizing For Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance Phase of 
Inter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative For Victims’ Representatives, 27 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 263, 265–66 (2012) (“In the inter-American human rights system, a particularly notable 
development is the evolution of a compliance phase of litigation before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights.”). 
 106. See Nino Tsereteli, The Relevance of the Principle of Subsidiarity for the Evolvement of 
Remedial Regimes of Regional Human Rights Courts (ECtHR and IACtHR) 5 (June 2014) (on file 
with author). 
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would be the state, not the Court, defining the reparations the state must 
provide. 
C. Authority and Context 
In recent years, the IAHRS has fallen under scrutiny and criticism. 
Countries as politically distinct as Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil have found 
themselves working together to denounce the system’s expansive and, as they 
argue, illegitimate powers.107 In 2013, some states successfully pushed for a so-
called “strengthening process” of the IAHRS, what some advocates and 
scholars described as a deliberate strategy to undermine some of the Inter-
American Commission’s powers.108 The Inter-American Court cannot function 
effectively when barraged with politically motivated attacks or when operating 
in a politically hostile environment. The solution is for the Court to garner 
greater political legitimacy, such that it may speak with authority on the matters 
before it. 
In sum, the Inter-American Court, as any international tribunal, needs the 
continuous support of its member states.109 By embracing normative 
subsidiarity, the Inter-American Court—and the Inter-American 
Commission—can foster, as a less aggressive and interventionist approach, a 
more collaborationist model for the enforcement of international human rights 
law. It is important that member states see the IAHRS as an opportunity, rather 
than as a threat. It would thus be wise for the Court to abandon its maximalist 
approach and embrace instead a theory of subsidiarity. Such a novel approach 
should grant member states some say regarding the protection of human rights, 
as the Court has timidly done recently.110 
V 
CONCLUSION 
It is traditionally held that international human rights regimes are 
supplementary to the law of individual states. International bodies act whenever 
domestic authorities fail to provide adequate remedies to victims of human 
rights violations. The principle of subsidiarity provides both a theoretical and 
practical foundation to determine how much authority a state should be granted 
 
 107. See Victoria Amato, Taking Stock of the Reflection on the Workings of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, 16 APORTES DPLF 4, 5, 8 (2012) and Daniel Cerqueira, Brazil, 
Ecuador, and the Inter-American Human Rights System, AMERICAS QUARTERLY, (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/brazil-ecuador-and-inter-american-human-rights-system. 
 108. See generally, e.g., Santiago A. Cantón, To Strengthen Human Rights, Change the OAS (Not 
the Commission), 20 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5 (2013). 
 109. See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the 
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 3 (observing that states’ 
delegation of jurisdiction upon international courts is not sufficient for international courts’ legal 
authority). 
 110. For instance, in the Atala Riffo decision, the Court cites domestic case law and thus bolsters 
its own ruling on sexual orientation. Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
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in the regulation of human rights affairs. In the specific context of the IAHRS, 
subsidiarity is not a salient feature. The system established a strong moral and 
legal voice through its early decisions on gross and massive human rights 
violations committed by authoritarian regimes. In such a context, deference is 
not a pressing need for regional courts. The Court embraces a weak version of 
subsidiarity.111 
Today, however, the situation is more complex. States are mostly well-
functioning democracies, with cases moving away from claims of mass atrocity 
to current issues such as the right to same-sex marriage. This landscape coexists, 
however, with some massive and gross human rights violations, as is the case, 
for instance, in Mexico.112 In such a changing and complex legal and political 
landscape, it may be time to reconsider the system’s reluctance toward 
subsidiarity as a principle for international adjudication. Since subsidiarity 
considerations must take into account the context where decisions are made,113 
the IAHRS should articulate its own notions of deference toward states. Just as 
some commentators have argued for a more egalitarian conception of judicial 
authority at the domestic level, international courts should also be aware of the 
risks that international judicial supremacy may entail.114 Reviewing instances in 
which both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court 
have used notions of subsidiarity reveals that consistent adoption of this 
principle is superior. Indeed, subsidiarity could enhance the system’s authority 
and acknowledge states’ positions as fundamental actors for the enforcement of 
international human rights norms. 
Furthermore, the system should distinguish more clearly instances where 
reasons for centralization can be found—as in cases where the right to life is at 
stake—from cases where there could be decentralization. Such an approach 
would not just enhance the system’s legitimacy but would also vindicate 
principles of democratic decisionmaking that are necessary to ensure that 
international governance rises in accordance to the domestic units that create 
and sustain it. 
 
 111. See supra note 15.  
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